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Unoccupied Aircraft Systems (UAS) are in the midst of aviation‘s next generation. UAS

are being utilized at an increasing rate by military and security operations and are becoming
widely popular in usage from search and rescue and weather research to homeland security and
border patrol. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is currently working to define
acceptable UAS performance standards and procedures for routine access for their use in the
National Airspace System (NAS). This study examined the effects of system reliability and time
pressure on unoccupied aircraft systems operator performance and mental workload. Twentyfour undergraduate and graduate students, male and female, from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University participated in this study on a voluntary basis. The primary tasks were image
processing time and target acquisition accuracy; three secondary tasks were concerned with
responding to events encountered in typical UAS operations. Mental workload, using the NASATask Load Index (TLX) form, and trust levels of Multi-Modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for
Remote Operation (MIIIRO) system were also studied and analyzed. System reliability was
found to produce a significant effect for image processing time, while time pressure produced a
significant effect for target acquisition accuracy and mental workload. A significant effect was
found for the interaction between system reliability and time pressure for pop-up threats rerouting processing time. The results were examined and recommendations for future research are
discussed.
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Introduction
The next generation of flight is already underway and Unoccupied Aircraft Systems
(UAS) are in the midst of aviation‘s next generation. Since their pre-aviation history, these
systems have proven themselves to be versatile, efficient, and valuable, and as such
approximately 50 companies, universities, and government organizations in the United States
(U.S.) alone are developing and producing some 155 unoccupied aircraft designs (Dorr &
Duquette, 2010). These same entities that are developing and producing these ―spies in the sky‖
are also spending billions of dollars in research efforts to improve UAS in terms of hardware,
software, and human-system interactions. Through years of research and development, UAS are
flying toward a future with many possibilities.
Unoccupied Aircraft Systems (UAS)
UAS, or Unoccupied Aircraft Systems, is the term that is on the verge of replacing
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, which was the official term coined by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and introduced by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to replace the
term Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). A typical UAS consists of the Unoccupied Aircraft
(UA), the Control System, the Datalink, and other related support equipment (Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle, n.d.). UAV‘s come in a variety of shapes and sizes and have wingspans that could range
as large as a Boeing 737 or even smaller than a radio-controlled model airplane. They serve
diverse services and are becoming widely popular in usage from search and rescue and weather
research to homeland security and border patrol. Until recently, military and security operations
were mainly supported by UAS; however, due to their increasing popularity, unoccupied aircraft
are growing to support ―aerial photography, surveying land and crops, monitoring forest fires
and environmental conditions, and protecting borders and ports against intruders‖ (Dorr &
1

Duquette, 2010) as they promise new innovations to increase efficiency, save money, and
enhance safety and even save lives. The UAS consists of the UAV, the Ground Control Station
(GCS), and other related support equipment. Since UAVs are unoccupied, a pilot on the ground
is in charge of UAS operations at all times. Figure 1 shows a picture of a U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection Predator UAV.

Figure 1: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection
Guardian/Predator UAV (From ALEA E-Newspaper, 2010)
UAS History
Past (Pre-aviation to 1980’s)
UAS history dates back to pre-aviation times; a time before manned aircraft even took
flight. The primitive technology of UAVs used for surveillance and combat has existed well
before manned aircraft first took flight on December 17, 1903. The first UAV took flight in the
U.S. in the 1910‘s during World War I when the military took extra notice of their potential in
combat after their success in test flights. For more than a decade after the end of World War I,
pilotless aircraft development in the U.S. and abroad drastically declined; however, new UAVs
emerged on the scene during the mid-to-late 1930‘s as an important combat training tool. In the
2

1940‘s, in the occurrence of World War II, the U.S. laid groundwork for post-war UAV
programs in light of Nazi Germany‘s innovative V-1, which demonstrated the ―formidable‖
threat that a UAV could impose in combat. The 1960‘s and 1970‘s brought on a new era of
UAVs, which took on a new role during the Vietnam War: ―stealth surveillance‖ and when the
U.S. set its sights on other types of UAVs. An aggressive UAV developer, the Israeli Air Force,
pioneered several new and important UAVs, which were integrated into the UAV fleet of the
U.S. and many other countries during the late 1970‘s and throughout the course of the 1980‘s
(Krock, 2002).
Present (1990’s to today)
UAVs in the 1990‘s became a permanent and critical position in high-tech military
arsenals ranging from the U.S. and Europe to Asia and the Middle East. UAVs are also playing
key roles in keeping the peace of the Earth‘s environment by commanding a monitoring role
(Krock, 2002). Currently, military and government agencies represent the major players for the
operation of UAVs; however, a large call for the expansion of UAVs into domestic and
commercial operations is on the rise, such as usage in law enforcement settings. For this reason,
the FAA, along with many private and educational agencies, is extensively researching the
integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS) with safety at the forefront of the
research. Today‘s UAS demands are paving the way for the future of the national airspace.
Future and the Next Generation Air Transportation System
As aviation‘s portal to the future, the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) is transforming the way America flies using 21st century technology. NextGen will
combine increased automation with new procedures to achieve economical, capacity, safety,
environmental, and security benefits by the year 2025 (Prevot, Lee, Smith, & Palmer, 2005).
3

NextGen will be better for the environment and the economy (Federal Aviation Administration
―Why NextGen Matters,‖ 2011) by:


Allowing travel to be predictable due to fewer delays.



Reducing aviation‘s impact on the environment. Flying will be quieter, cleaner, and more
fuel-efficient.



Being more proactive in preventing incursions.



Getting the necessary information to the right person at the right time.



Improving the nation‘s economy.



Making better use of airports by attracting new jobs and helping current employers
expand their business.



Meeting the needs of increasing national security and providing the highest levels of
safety for travelers.
One of the strategic objectives of NextGen is to make ―the National Airspace System

(NAS) scalable and flexible enough to incorporate various and new types of aircraft,‖ including
UAVs. The FAA is currently working to ―define acceptable UAS performance standards and
procedures for routine access, all while maintaining safety‖ in order to alleviate existing
restrictions associated with UAS operations. This will be done by improving UAS operations by
using state-of-the-art technologies, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP); NAS Voice
System (NVS); Digitally Networked Radio System (DNRS), which is used as an interim solution
for UAS operations in the event of Loss of Voice Communication and may be utilized as a
backup, or even primary means of communications network between Air Traffic Control (ATC),
UAS GCS, or within Air Traffic Management (ATM); and Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
Broadcast (ADS-B), which uses global positioning system satellites and on-board technology
4

that are superior to radar and provides broader and more precise coverage of an aircraft‘s
position, altitude, and velocity; among many other technologies (Federal Aviation
Administration Task E: UAS Demo (3) Test Plan, 2010). These new technologies, some of
which are currently being used in limited capacities, will greatly help with many integration
issues, such as the UAV‘s ability to ―sense-and-avoid,‖ UAV Pilot situational awareness, and
most importantly safety through the Safety Management System (SMS), which consists of four
components: safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion
(Figure 2) (Federal Aviation Administration Task E: UAS Demo (3) Test Plan, 2010).

Figure 2: The Four Safety Management System (SMS) Components (From Federal Aviation
Administration Task E: UAS Demo (3) Test Plan, 2010)
Human Factors in UAS
Interest in using UAS for an extensive range of purposes is quickly increasing within the
aviation community, making UAS access to the NAS a priority (Federal Aviation Administration
Task E: UAS Demo (3) Test Plan, 2010). The increasing popularity of UAS is creating a
dilemma that is: how will they be integrated into the NAS? This question has brought the
5

attention of research and development in military, government, and civil entities. Many critical
issues have arisen in integrating UAVs into an airspace that is already populated with
commercial airlines and private jets. Among these many issues are (Hottman & Sortland, 2006):


Ground Control Stations: This issue relates to whether or not a single or multiple UAVs
will be operated. Knowing this question can help in determining how many operators
should be in the control station and what functions they should perform.



UAV operator qualifications: Questions such as ―what attributes and skills does the
operator possess?‖ ―How well does he or she know the system?‖ ―What kind of
background do they have?‖ ―How much flying experience do they have?‖ All of these
questions plus much more should be taken into consideration when screening and testing
potential UAV operators. The degree to which they are qualified is important to keeping
a safe environment.



Validation of sense-and-avoid technologies: Making sure the sense-and-avoid
technologies are all working as they should and doing what they are required to do is
essential in the design and operating principles of UAVs.



UAV call signs: Call signs are important to have when it comes to knowing which UAV
is which. It also helps in knowing its location and what its intended mission is.



UAV communication with ATC: Having a communication standard between the operator
of the UAV and ATC is crucial when dealing with safety and security. This would allow
the UAV operator to know what is going on in the surrounding airspace of the UAV and
know whether or not it is entering any restricted space where a commercial flight or
general flight may be in order to not cause any incursions.
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UAS operations are multi-faceted and complex. Understanding what those operations entail and
the automation behind them could help in determining how to use combinations of automation
with UAS procedures in making the system a better one that not only decreases key human
factors issues, such as workload on an operator, but also allows an operator to maintain full
control at all times (Prevot, et al., 2005).
Humans and Automation
Today, humans tend to rely heavily on technology and automation. For many, going
through a day without some sort of technology would be unheard of with the amount of
dependency society has on technology. Automation is highly valuable, especially in dangerous
and sensitive environments. Designers automate systems to replace or aid human performance
for many reasons; however, these reasons could be generally placed into four categories
(Wickens, Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004):
1. Impossible or hazardous: This reason deals with automating process that would normally
be either dangerous or impossible for humans to perform, such as in handling hazardous
materials.
2. Difficult or unpleasant: While not impossible for a human to perform, some tasks may be
very challenging or difficult for a human to properly perform, such as multiplying large
numbers together. Although this may be done in the head or by multiplying on a piece of
paper, it is usually easier and quicker to do using a calculator.
3. Extend human capability: This category deals with aiding, not replacing, the human
operator to perform something in otherwise difficult circumstances.

7

4. Technically possible: Even though this category may provide little to no value to the
human user, sometimes systems are automated simply because they can be; the
technology is there and is inexpensive to do.
A fine balance between humans and automation needs to exist in order to reap the many
benefits automation has to offer.
Automation Reliability
Throughout the years, automation has played significant roles in how the world operates
and sometimes it may even seem as though automation is taking over how the world operates.
Automation has a number of many real benefits in aiding human performance and alleviating
humans from performing dangerous or tedious jobs (Wickens, et al., 2004), but like everything
else in the world, automation is not perfect and thus comes with its own set of issues, literally
and metaphorically. Researchers in the field of Human Factors have spent years researching
different types of automation and developing statistics based off of a multitude of data gathered
from experimental studies in order to integrate automation as user-friendly and user-centered in
today‘s fast paced and highly technology dependent society. The problem with automation is not
merely due to failures with hardware and software components, but rather with the system
problems of automation that ―are distinctly and inexorably linked to human issues of attention,
perception, and cognition‖ in administering the automated system in its normally operating state
(Wickens, et al., 2004). Although having systems that can be fully automated or semi-automated
help ease the workload of the individual using it, these systems have a set of draw-backs. One
issue with autonomy in UAS is the question of ―how much automation should the system have‖
and ―what part of the system should be controlled by the operator?‖ This issue leads to design
challenges of the system for engineers in terms of how the system should be designed to where it
8

helps the operator maintain productivity without work or cognitive overload but at the same time
keep the operator active so as to not lose situational awareness. Another issue is sub-tasks with
the question of ―will a single operator or a team of operators need to conduct multiple tasks at
once?‖ This issue is concerned with the causation of work overload, a decrease in situational
awareness, and confusion, among other factors. It requires operators to use many cognitive skills
that could be tiring and lead to a decrease in productivity (Weil, Freeman, MacMillan, Jackson,
Mauer, Patterson, & Linegang, 2006). Other issues consist of displays and controls; automation
and system failures; and crew composition, selection, and training (McCarley & Wickens, 2004).
Additional issues, in relation to human-centered automation (Table 1), include workload;
operational situation awareness and system-mode awareness; automation dependencies and skill
retention, and interface alternatives (Wise, Hopkin, & Garland, 2010).
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Table 1: Human-Centered Automation (From Wise, et al., 2010)

Despite of the long list of human factors issues with automation of all types, including
UAS automation, it is necessary to narrow research efforts to specific issues of automation in
order to produce progress in making the automation better for the operators. As such, many
military, government, and civil entities are tirelessly conducting research in hopes of improving
UAS automation, such as the FAA‘s NextGen Flight Deck Human Factors Research and
Development Program. In conjunction with other FAA research and development programs, this
program is aiming to identify and resolve human factors issues through research activities
(Federal Aviation Administration ―NextGen Flight Deck,‖ 2009).
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Over Trust of the Automation
Over trust, also known as complacency or misuse, happens as a result of humans placing
too much trust in automation, which could lead to severe negative consequences if the
automation in question is not fully reliable. Over trust is likely to occur when an individual uses
a particular system that rarely encounters failures; hence the skewed perception of the individual,
which leads to the belief that the automation is perfect. The problem that arises from
complacency, or the failure to monitor the system adequately and thus causing problems for the
human to properly intervene when a system failure takes place, is due to the following three
distinct categories:
(1) Detection: The complacent operator would take a longer time than what is necessary
to detect a real failure in a system. It is said that ―the more reliable the automation,
the rarer the ‗signal events‘ become, and the poorer is their detection‖ (Parasuraman
et al., 1996 from Wickens, et al., 2004).
(2) Situation awareness: An individual who is actively participating or monitoring
something has a greater dynamic state of awareness and of his or her surroundings in
comparison to an individual that is passively monitoring something or someone
(Wickens, et al., 2004). This phenomenon is known as the generation effect
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Hopkin & Wise, 1996) and results
in a less likelihood of that individual intervening correctly or appropriately as a result
of being out of the loop and not fully understanding the momentary state of the
system (Sarter & Woods, 2000). In addition to this, situation awareness becomes even
more problematic if the system is poorly designed to give adequate feedback in
regards to the ongoing state of the automated process.
11

(3) Skill loss: As automation increases, operator skills tend to decrease. Wiener (1988)
describes a skill loss term known as deskilling, which refers to the ―gradual loss of
skills‖ than an operator may inherently experience due to not being actively
participating in the control operation or decision making process of an automated
system. Losing the ability to remember certain skills and operations may have two
implications on the operator (Lee & Moray, 1994). These two implications on the
operator include: (1) becoming less confident in his or her own performance and thus
more likely to continue using the automation to do everything, and (2) degrading the
operator‘s ability to appropriately intervene should a failure in the system occur.
Additionally, another implication may arise depending on how far the skills of the
operator degrades in which the automation may end up masking the incompetence of
the operator.
In addition to the above mentioned implications, the automated system may sometimes
fail and hand over responsibility to the operator, which is usually the most challenging of
problems for the human. As a result, more problems may arise in overcoming the system‘s
failure and dealing with the situation at hand due to the operator‘s complacency in the automated
system and decrease in skill level (Hopkin & Wise, 1996). Figure 3 shows the elements in which
automation reliability and human trust correspond.

12

Figure 3: Elements of automation reliability and human trust (From Wickens, et al., 2004)
Human-Computer Interfaces
Precursors to modern computer technology can be traced back to ancient times with the
age of electronic digital computers beginning roughly in the middle of the 20th century
(Helander, Landauer, & Prabhu, 1997). Despite the fact that computers have been around for
decades and have enormously impacted modern society; however, they are considered to be
relatively new tools as they exist in a phase of rapid development and tend to be complex in
nature. Many pieces of hardware and software that make up what is known as the modern
computer are crucial to its function and so is its design and interface. General interface designs
should incorporate eight principles in order to make the interface user-friendly. These eight
principles (Wickens, et al., 2004) consist of:
1. Match between system and real world, such as speaking the user‘s language and using
familiar conceptual models or metaphors.
13

2. Consistency of the interface internally, such as same information types located in same
location throughout, and with respect to any existing standards.
3. Visibility of system status; make sure the user is informed about what is going on with
the system.
4. Allowing the user to maintain control of the system and freedom to initiate actions
5. Error prevention, recognition, and recovery methods that help users recognize, diagnose,
and recover from errors, if any arise, in addition to clear and explicit error messages.
6. Memory; providing lists of choices and picking from lists, using see-and-point instead or
remember-and-type.
7. Flexibility and efficiency of use by providing shortcuts and the ability to initiate, reorder,
and/or cancel tasks.
8. Simplicity and aesthetic integrity with all information appearing in a natural and logical
order.
Although these eight principles should be applied to the design of human-computer
interfaces, this is not always the case and as a result, many errors, whether from the human
operator or from the computer system, arise. Many researchers have, and are currently,
researching the issue of human-computer interactions and their interfaces, even though
arguments have been brought up to the futile nature of these researches and have marked them
unnecessary. However, these arguments bear little weight as research on human-computer
interactions serve as a building stone for future technology ―by revealing the aspects of human
tasks and activities most in need of augmentation and discovering effective ways to provide it‖
(Helander, et al., 1997). Through these research studies, a multitude of information has shown
what makes a good interface design and what doesn‘t, but more importantly which of these good
14

designs are tailored around the end-user. Human factors issues that relate to interface designs are
generally due to the lack of human-computer interactions. These interactions are necessary as
many times the computer is either too difficult for the human to understand or the computer is
simply too automated, leaving the human user unaware of the system‘s status.
UAS System Reliability and Trust
Technology has quickly immersed itself into society and the UAS is no exception. The
relation between reliability and trust in automation is a critical one when discussing its
importance in relation to human performance issues. Within the human factors context, the
reliability of automation is said to be the extent to which it does what the human operator expects
it to do, such as a copy machine that faithfully reproduces the number of pages requested or a
car‘s cruise control that holds the car at a set speed. However, the reliability of automation is not
the main concern, but rather its perceived reliability. At least four reasons exist as to why
automation may be perceived as unreliable. First, considering that automated systems are
complex and have more components than manually operated systems, the automation may be
unreliable as a result of design flaws ending in component failure. Second, the automation‘s
system design may not be suitable for certain tasks that the automation is performing as all
automation have a limited operating range within which designers assume it will be used. Third,
the automation may be incorrectly set up by the operator. Fourth, at times the logic behind the
automation is too complex for the operator to understand whether or not it is performing
correctly, whereas in actuality the automation is doing exactly what it is meant to do. An
important aspect in automation reliability is realizing that often times the automation is asked to
perform certain tasks that are themselves dynamic and uncertain in nature, such as weather
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forecasting or predicting enemy intent; therefore, it would be simply impossible for the
automation to perform at a high level of reliability (Wickens, et al., 2004).
Trust ―should be in direct proportion to its reliability,‖ whether it is in another human or
in a computer, and should be well ―calibrated;‖ however, there is evidence that the trust a human
puts into automation is not entirely well calibrated. Inappropriate calibration of trust, or
―automation bias,‖ (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998) is defined as either too high or too
low; too high a trust level in automation could lead to complacency, whereas too low a trust level
could lead to distrust with the system going un-used. Distrust is a type of mistrust, which occurs
when trust in something is not directly related to its reliability. Distrust in automation may occur
due to a number of reasons, such as the failure to understand the nature of the automation and its
algorithms, which may lead to inefficiency where the human may ―reject the good assistance that
automation can offer‖ (Wickens, et al., 2004) and prefer to do a certain task by hand, resulting in
slower performance, less accuracy, and an increase in workload. Two terms that exemplify the
inappropriate levels of trust are misuse and disuse. Misuse refers to the failures that crop up
when people rely on automation inappropriately, while disuse refers to the failures that arise
when people discard the capabilities of the automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Trust in
automation by an operator needs to be appropriately calibrated as extremes could pose to be
dangerous. Figure 4 shows the relationship between trust and automation reliability.
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Figure 4: Relationship between trust and automation reliability (From Nisser & Westin, 2006)
Mental Workload
Mental workload is a primitive construct term that is fundamentally complex and
multifaceted, which ―‗everyone knows,‘ but hardly anybody can define in precise, operationally
useful terms‖ (Hancock & Meshkati, 1988). Sarno and Wickens (1995) refer to workload as the
relationship between resource supply and task demand. It will be assumed that mental workload
is representative of the cost that is incurred by the human operator to achieve a particular level in
his or her performance and will thus be defined as human-centered, rather than task-centered.
The subjective workload that an individual experiences consists of the influences of multiple and
simultaneous factors in addition to objective demands imposed on the individual by a certain
task. Workload can be summarized as an innate property that emerges from the ―interaction
between the requirements of a task, the circumstances under which it is performed, and the skills,
behaviors, and perceptions of the operator‖ (Hart & Staveland, 1988). Figure 5 shows a
conceptual framework relating human performance and workload.
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Figure 5: Conceptual Framework relating Human Performance and Workload (From Hart &
Staveland, 1988)
In order to understand workload in a relatively easy manner, the concept could be
described in terms of a ratio, TR/TA, which is representative of the time required (TR) to do a
certain task/s to the time available (TA) to complete them. A workload timeline model depicting
the different tasks that need to be performed and how long those tasks would typically be
outlined if a researcher wishes to calculate the workload an operator would experience in a
particular environment. This ratio calculation can be derived on the basis of a careful task
analysis and is designed to accomplish two objectives, which include: (1) predicting how much
workload a human would experience, and (2) predicting the extent to which performance would
suffer due to workload overload. Thus, mental workload can be generally defined as the ratio of
the resources required to the resources available (Wickens, et al., 2004).
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Workload‘s innate property in the operation of UAS is crucial to an operator‘s
performance and perceived mental workload. To alleviate the downside of workload, the
implementation of automation can come in handy for a myriad of various tasks; making certain
tasks plausible for the operator to perform more complex tasks for which they are better suited.
High levels of automation, however, can affect the workload of a UAS operator in ways that
require further scrutiny.
Research has found that allocation of flight control to automation led to higher
performance on simultaneous target identification and system failure identification tasks, these,
however, were attributed to the reduced level of workload (Dixon, Wickens, and Chang, 2003).
High levels of workload can lead an operator performing detrimentally; however, levels of
workload that are too low can cause the same effect (Crescenzio, Miranda, Periani, & Bombardi,
2007). Low workload levels often cause the operator to lose track of tasks the system is
performing and lose situation awareness, which inevitably cause problems in the operator‘s
performance levels. As a side effect of low workload levels, an increase in workload takes place
when the operator needs to become involved in the system again as he or she attempts to regain
the lost situation awareness, such as during an unforeseen event.
Measuring Mental Workload
As the modern world quickly immerses itself into the world of technology, the need to
subjectively measure the mental workload of an individual performing certain tasks in particular
environments is growing. The ability to understand and apply the findings of an individual‘s
perceived mental workload is a sought after need and want by researchers in the field of human
factors and ergonomics as searches for ―higher levels of comfort, satisfaction, efficiency, and
safety in the workplace‖ (Rubio, Diaz, Martin, & Puente, 2004) become more demanding. The
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evaluation of mental workload is dependent upon the following seven requirements (Rubio, et
al., 2004):
1. Sensitivity: The ability for an assessment tool to detect changes in a task‘s difficulty
or demands.
2. Diagnosticity: The ability for an assessment tool to identify changes in workload
variation and the reason for such changes.
3. Selectivity/Validity: The ability for an assessment tool to differentiate sensitivity
levels in changes to cognitive demands and not to changes in other variables, such as
physical workload or emotional stress that are not essentially associated with mental
workload.
4. Intrusiveness: The ability for an assessment tool to not interfere with the primary task
performance, the load that is the actual object of evaluation.
5. Reliability: The ability for an assessment tool to consistently reflect the mental
workload.
6. Implementation requirements: The inclusion of aspects related to such things as time,
instruments, and software that are used for the collection and analysis of data.
7. Subject acceptability: The perception of the subject, or participant, of the validity and
usefulness of the procedure.
With the ability to evaluate systems and assess operator mental workload, subjective
workload measuring assessments have become increasingly important tools. Their growing
popularity, ease of implementation, and frequent usage are due to their practical, non-intrusive,
nature that aid in the collection of data and their ability to provide sensitive measures of operator
load. As automation in human-machine systems is becoming more complex, the ability to
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evaluate an operator‘s performance is becoming more difficult, which, in turn, makes the need
for subjective mental workload assessment even the more critical.
NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) Assessment Tool
The NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) Assessment Tool is one, among many, subjective
mental workload assessment tools that is used to assess workload in a variety of human-machine
environments. It is a multi-dimensional rating procedure that ―derives an overall workload score
based on a weighted average of ratings on six subscales‖ (NASA TLX: Task Load Index, n.d.)
that includes: mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and
frustration. It is assumed that some combination of these six subscales, or dimensions, is likely to
represent an individual‘s experienced workload while performing certain tasks (Hart, 2006).
Table 2 shows the descriptions of each of the above mentioned dimensions (Rubio, et al., 2004).
The measurement of these dimensions in regards to a UAS operator is important in order to
understand the operator‘s perceived mental workload. The weighting scheme that is used by this
assessment tool was designed to increase assessment sensitivity, to relevant variables, while
decreasing between-rater variability (Hart, 2006).
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Table 2: NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) Dimensions Descriptions (From Rubio, et al., 2004)

The NASA-TLX is available in either a traditional paper-pencil version or a
computerized version. Since its development by the Human Performance Group at NASA‘s
Ames Research Center, it has been subjected to a variety of independent studies in the evaluation
of its assessing of reliability, sensitivity, and utility, in addition to being compared to other
methods of measuring workload (Hart, 2006).
Time Pressure
Time pressure has become an increasingly prominent feature in work environments. Time
pressure has been defined as ―either subjectively perceived time pressure or the imposition of a
deadline,‖ which increases the rate of individual and group performance (Kelly & Karau, 1993,
1999 in Amabile, Mueller, Simpson, Hadley, Kramer, & Fleming, 2002). A ―time famine‖ has
been identified from both the business press and organizational literature in which individuals
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feel as though there are ―never enough hours in the work day‖ (Perlow, 1999 in Amabile, et al.,
2002). In an environment that is time sensitive, such as that of UAS operations, the effects of
time pressure may be too great. Time pressure is a critical issue when it comes to performing a
specific task or duty; having a constricted time limit to complete something adds on stress to an
individual in addition to increased mental workload as cognitive processes work extra hard to
meet the demands constricted upon it. It also leads to ―faster motions in completing a task,‖
which may cause physiological stress, such as strain on the muscles (Hughes, 2004), on top of
the stress already imposed on cognitive processes. Extensive research has been sought out on the
issue of time pressure. Research has shown that the effects of time pressure, in relation to
decision making, causes operators to submit to coping processes, which include acceleration,
filtering, and omission. Acceleration denotes an increase in the rate of information processing;
filtering refers to processing certain parts of information more than other parts; omission, which
is also referred to as ―shallower search for information,‖ implies completely ignoring particular
parts of information. However, research has also shown that a process known as ―regression to
learnt behaviors‖ is a common cognitive strategy in which the operator has ―a tendency to lock
into one problem solving strategy under time pressure even if it suboptimal‖ (Boussemart,
Donmez, Cummings, & Las Fargeas, 2009).
Time pressure in UAS operations is a critical factor when it comes to performance.
Research demonstration has found that performance decreased as a result of an increase in
workload due to time pressure, particularly in tasks, such as target acquisition, that already
present high levels of stress to the operator (Hughes & Babski-Reeves, 2005). According to
Burke, Oron-Gilad, Conway, and Hancock (2007), time pressure, during a target acquisition task,
resulted in the degradation of operator ability in distinguishing friend from foe. Situations such
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as these pose serious threats to military operations. Although time pressure may make a
somewhat tedious and boring task more interesting and enjoyable, it could also cause higher
levels of stress and mental overload, which result in poorer performance levels, increased fatigue
and mental workload, and poor decision making skills, among others.
Effects of Time Pressure
Stress
One of the effects caused by high time pressure is stress. Stress is a difficult and often
confusing subject as it is a psychological concept that is not concrete; one cannot touch it or
perceive it directly (Driskell & Salas, 1996). Stress can take effect from a multitude of factors; it
can be imposed by having too much to do in too little time. According to Wickens, et al. (2004),
the ratio TR/TA, which was described earlier in the section regarding mental workload, plays a
significant role in causing stress. If there is not enough time available to perform a certain task,
stress levels of an operator increases as he or she tries to finish the task quickly in the time
allotted while at the same time do well in performance. Stress and performance go hand-in-hand.
Figure 6 portrays a four-stage process model of stress and performance (Driskell & Salas, 1996)
in which stimuli from the environment, the first stage of the process, is first activated by noise,
time pressure, task load, threats, or group pressure. Once a threat is perceived, the process moves
on to the second stage, appraisal, where the extent of that threat is evaluated. The appraisal then
leads to the third stage, performance expectations. This stage is concerned with feelings of selfefficacy or mastery. If perceived resources are exceeded by demands, then negative performance
expectations are formed; however, if it is perceived that the available resources exceed the
perceived threat, then positive performance expectations are formed, which is a crucial factor in
preparing personnel to operate under high-demand conditions. The addition of time constraints to
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completing tasks increases the demand of completing those tasks in a certain time frame, thus
exceeding the perceived resources to complete them and resulting in negative performance
expectations.

Figure 6: Four-stage model of Stress and Performance (Adapted from Driskell & Salas, 1996)
Lastly, stress outcomes, the fourth and final stage, consist of various types of stress, including:


Physiological reactions that incorporate various measures relating to heart beat, pulse
rate, blood pressure, blood glucose levels, eye blink duration, and respiratory rate, among
many.



Emotional reactions, which may include subjective feelings of anxiety or fear, frustration,
annoyance, tension, and an increased concern of well-being for self and others.



Social reactions that could lead to less cooperation in a team environment, neglect
towards social or interpersonal cues, and increased interpersonal aggression with a
decrease in tendency to provide a helping hand to others.



Cognitive effects as a result of stress can cause narrowing of attention, distraction, tunnel
vision, longer reaction time, increased errors, and memory deficits, among others.
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Performance in stress relates to performance accuracy (the number of errors incurred on a
task), performance speed (the required time to perform a task), and performance
variability (variability in accuracy and speed).

Completing a task, in general, may be stressful, especially in sensitive and dangerous
environments. As a result, the issue of stress, and its outcomes, is an important factor to take into
consideration, particularly when assigning tasks under high-pressure conditions.
Decision Making
Decision making is another effect caused by high time pressure. Each new day brings
about its own challenges, one of which is the ability to make every day decisions; however, this
ability can prove to be difficult at times. Decision making is generally a task in which (a) a
person must choose one option from a number of alternatives, (b) there is a relative amount of
information, with respect to the option, available, (c) the timeframe is relatively longer than a
second, and (d) the choice chosen is not necessarily clear to be the best and thus is associated
with uncertainty (Wickens, et al., 2004). Making decisions could either be riskless or risky.
Riskless decisions are characterized by using mathematical models to identify decision
strategies, such as the Elimination-by-Aspects Rule where an individual chooses between
alternatives ―by selecting the most important attribute and rejecting all alternatives that fail to
meet the cutoff.‖ Risky decisions, on the other hand, are characterized by ―couplings between
alternatives and outcomes that are probabilistic and thereby cannot be predicted with certainty‖
(Svenson & Maule, 1993). Through understanding these processes, good decision makers take
the time to assess the costs and benefits of each decision, first; however, not all decisions come
with the comfort of time. Limiting the time to make a decision decreases the ability to make a
sound decision and increases stress as decision making is commonly represented by the
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following three phases or stages that often cycle and iterate in a single decision in working
memory:
1. Acquiring, perceiving, and integrating information or cues relating to the decision,
2. Generating and selecting hypotheses or situation assessments about the meaning of the
cues in regards to the current and future state of the decision, and
3. Planning and selecting choices to take based on the inferred state and the costs and
benefits of the different possible outcomes.
These three stages impose cognitive limits that are crucial to conscious, effortful decision
making. Decision making is so much more than just choosing one option out of many; it has a lot
to do with how the human brain operates, from working memory to long-term memory, all have
an important influence in the information-processing aspect of decision making. The
information-processing model of decision making is depicted in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Information-processing model of decision making (From Wickens, et al., 2004)
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Decision making is crucial to UAS operations as operators are expected to make important
decisions frequently and rapidly, such as deciphering whether a tank or target is a friend or a foe.
Research on decision making has been extensive, although, initially, the focus of the research
had been on optimal, rational decision making. It was assumed that researchers would be able to
specify the costs and benefits, or values, associated with making different choices and then apply
mathematical models to those values in order to yield the optimal choice that would maximize
their benefits and minimize their costs. This type of decision making is sometimes referred to as
normative decision making, which revolves around the central concept, the overall value of the
choice, and the ―worth,‖ or importance, each outcome has on the individual making the decision.
In addition to this model, another model, known as descriptive decision making is where
decision makers rely on rules-of-thumb, or simpler and less-complete means, to come to a
decision (Wickens, et al., 2004). Although many models and heuristics exist to explain the
process of decision making, it takes time and mental power to choose what is thought to be the
optimal choice and limiting that time could lead to an increase in stress and making incorrect
choices, which in turn could be disastrous in sensitive environments such as in national security.
Summary
In the midst of aviation‘s next generation, the UAS exists. The highly versatile, efficient,
valuable, and autonomous nature of the UAS has been extensively debated by researchers. Since
their pre-aviation history, the environments in which UAS operate and the operators themselves
have been a major topic in the research field as they pose significant human factors questions. In
order to attain the full potential of this technology, one must understand the relationship between
the system and the human operator. This relationship exists through the interface in which the
system and the human operator interact.
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Since the dawn of their creation, the primitive technology of UAVs was used for
surveillance and combat well before manned aircraft first took flight on December 17, 1903; now
leading aviation‘s portal to the future with NextGen, transforming the way America flies using
21st century technology. Despite of the long list of human factors issues with UAS automation, a
narrowing of research efforts is necessary in order to expand research knowledge in regards to
human capabilities and limitations as it exists within UAS operations.
One area of research concern is UAS system reliability and the trust the operator places
on that system. The relation between reliability and trust in automation is a crucial one when
discussing its importance in relation to human performance issues. Reliability of a system is one
in which the system does what it is meant to do or designed to do. However, nothing is perfect
and the system is not 100% reliable at all times. This issue needs to be well researched in order
to teach the operator what cues to look for when the system does not act accordingly. This is
where the issue of trust in the system falls into place. Trust should be in direct proportion to its
reliability, and should also be well calibrated; however, there is evidence that the trust a human
puts into automation is not entirely well calibrated, being either too high or too low; too high
trust in automation could lead to complacency, whereas too low trust could lead to distrust with
the system going un-used.
Mental workload is one area of limitation that operators experience with their interaction
with the UAS interface. Workload levels could range from too high, causing performance
detriments, to too low, causing difficulty for the operator to maintain vigilance. To alleviate the
downside of workload, the implementation of automation can make certain tasks plausible for
the operator to perform more complex tasks; however, the implementation of this automation
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needs to maintain an appropriate balance so as to not dramatically lower workload but at the
same time alleviate the overload imposed on the operator.
Time Pressure is another area of concern in the research field. In a time sensitive UAS
environment, the effects of time pressure may be too great on the operator causing mental
overload and resulting in diminished performance. Although time pressure may make a mundane
task more interesting and enjoyable, having a small time frame to complete a task, such as target
acquisition, could lead to an increase in the operator‘s stress level. This increase in stress levels
could in turn lead to poor decision making skills that could be the difference in mistaking a
friend for a foe.
Objective
The objective of this study was to investigate the effects of system reliability and time
pressure on UAS operator performance and mental workload. Participants‘ perceived trust was
also investigated for exploratory reasons.

Method
Participants
Twenty-four students, male and female, from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
were recruited for this study on a voluntary basis. Participants received either extra credit in an
undergraduate course or $10 for their participation and had the chance to win $50 for best overall
performance. Participants were asked to sign an informed consent form (Appendix A)
acknowledging their willingness to participate in this study. To mitigate any confounding
variables, a biographical questionnaire (Appendix B), that elicited the participant‘s
video/computer gaming experience, was given prior to the start of the study. Gender was not
taken into consideration for recruitment purposes in this study.
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Apparatus
The apparatus of this study consisted of a test bed built around the Multi-Modal
Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote Operation (MIIIRO) operator interface, which
provided a 3D model of UAVs and their environment and was run on a standard computer. The
MIIIRO software was designed by IA Tech, Inc., with support from the Air Force Research
Laboratory, ―to perform or simulate the operations of a number of autonomous UAVs‖ (Tso,
Tharp, Tai, Draper, Calhoun, & Ruff, 2003). It is a synthetic task environment which allows for
flexible emulation of ―envisioned single operator supervision of multiple UAVs‖ (Galster,
Nelson, & Bolia, n.d.) and consists of (1) a community of intelligent agents that are used to
integrate, assimilate, and present data, as well as interact with the operator to plan and control the
remote systems and mission payloads, (2) an immersive environment, and (3) multi-modal inputs
that includes head tracker and joystick to allow for efficient interactions (IA Tech, Inc., n.d.).
The setup arrangement included two monitors, a standard computer mouse, and a
QWERTY keyboard. The first monitor (Figure 8) portrayed the Tactical Situation Display
(TSD), which provided a plan view of the mission environment, including waypoints, flight
segments, targets, and threats, in addition to icons showing the positions and status for each of
the UAVs. The Mission Mode Indicator (MMI), which displayed a series of lights (green,
yellow, and red), was also displayed at the top of the TSD (Tso, et al., 2003). The second
monitor (Figure 9) was used for image processing and showed the Image Management Display
(IMD) that included an image cue and image display.
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Figure 8: MIIIRO Tactile Situation Display
(TSD)

Figure 9: MIIIRO Image Management
Display (IMD)

Design
A 2x2 within subjects, fully factorial design was used for this study. The study consisted
of two IVs; system reliability and time pressure (Table 3). The first IV, system reliability,
consisted of target images appearing with a high reliability measured at 80% or with a low
reliability measured at 40%. The second IV, time pressure, consisted of either a 5 or a 10 second
time limit during the target acquisition task in which the participant either had 5 seconds to
acquire the target or 10 seconds to acquire the target. If the participant was unable to do so
within the specific time limits, the MIIIRO software acquired the targets for them and moved on
to the next target. These specific measurements for system reliability and time pressure were
based on previous scholarly theses. A 4x4 Latin Square (LS) design (Table 4) was used to
determine the order of which first and second IVs were to be presented to the participants; this
was done in order to counter balance any learning effects. The LS design derived its name from
―an ancient puzzle that was concerned with the number of different ways that Latin letters can be
arranged in a square matrix so that each letter appears once in each row and each column‖
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(Weiner, Freedheim, Schinka, & Velicer, 2003). Table 5 shows the LS-4 design for this
experiment, where the number 4, in LS-4, denotes the number of levels of the treatment. The first
treatment scenario, 1, denotes 40% system reliability with 5 seconds time pressure. The second
treatment scenario, 2, denotes 40% system reliability with 10 seconds time pressure. The third
treatment scenario, 3, denotes 80% system reliability with 5 seconds time pressure. The fourth
and last treatment scenario, 4, denotes 80% system reliability with 10 seconds time pressure. The
order presented in Table 5 was repeated for every 6 participants, resulting in 4 repetitions for a
total of 24 participants. The dependant variables (DVs) that were collected were operator
performance and mental workload. Mental workload was subjectively reported by the
participants using the NASA-TLX standardized subjective workload scale (Appendix C) after
each of the four scenarios, while operator performance, in terms of image processing time, target
acquisition accuracy, MMI processing time, pop-up threats re-route processing time, and Intruder
Aircraft (IA) processing time, were objectively measured by the MIIIRO software.
Table 3: Experimental Design
Time Pressure
5 seconds
X
X

40%
80%

System
Reliability

10 seconds
X
X

Table 4: 4x4 Latin Square Design

1
2
3
4

1
--2,1
3,1
4,1

2
1,2
--3,2
4,2

3
1,3
2,3
--4,3

4
1,4
2,4
3,4
---
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Table 5: LS-4 Experimental Design
Order of Treatment Scenarios
Group 1
(Participants 1, 5,
9, 13, 17, and 21)
Group 2
(Participants 2, 6,
10, 14, 18, and
22)
Group 3
(Participants 3, 7,
11, 15, 19, and
23)
Group 4
(Participants 4, 8,
12, 16, 20,and
24)

1

2

4

3

2

3

1

4

3

4

2

1

4

1

3

2

Primary Task
The primary task in this study was that of target acquisition. Due to the high level of
autonomy used for the UAS in the MIIIRO software, the participants were not required to
directly control the flight of the UAV. To make up the flight path in which the UAV trailed,
waypoints were preset in addition to 10 preset image capture locations. These 10 preset image
capture locations were associated with certain waypoint locations along the UAV flight path.
Participants were asked to view the images collected by the UAV and to decipher whether or not
the Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) tool, that was part of the IMD on the second computer
monitor and had the ability to recognize targets or objects based on data obtained from the
MIIIRO software, had correctly selected the targets at the current waypoint the UAV was
located. Each waypoint contained at least one terrain vehicle, which may or may not have been a
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target, in addition to distracters that were randomly present at certain waypoints. The ATR,
which had two preset reliability percentages at 40% and 80%, placed a red box (Figure 10)
around what it recognized as a target. Reliability percentage at 40% corresponded to the ATR
being correct 40 percent of the time while 80% reliability corresponded to the ATR being correct
80 percent of the time. As a result, the ATR was not always correct and sometimes placed the red
box around non-targets and/or distracters; in those cases, the participant was required to deselect
the incorrect images, select the correct ones, and click on ―accept‖ on the IMD using the standard
computer mouse. In the cases where the ATR recognized all the correct targets, the participant
should have clicked on ―accept;‖ however, if the ATR recognized non-targets and/or distracters
and no targets were present, the participant should have instead clicked on ―reject.‖ If no action
was taken by the participant in the allocated time pressure, the automation processed and
―accepted‖ the red boxed images, as is.
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Figure 10: Image Management Display (IMD) with Automatic Target Recognition (ATR)
placing red boxes around perceived targets
The MIIIRO software automatically measured the results of the primary task. These
objective measures consisted of image processing time and target acquisition accuracy.
Secondary Task
There were three secondary tasks in this study that consisted of: (1) processing IA, (2)
responding to automation made flight path change recommendations, and (3) monitoring the
MMI.
The first secondary task consisted of processing IA that entered the operational airspace.
The mission of this task was to imitate the occurrence of unexpected IA that may enter into the
airspace, which required a quick and attentive response from the participant as it is considered to
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be a highly critical situation in typical UAS operations. In order to distinguish between the UAV
in the study and the unexpected aircraft, the IA resembled a red aircraft (Figure 11) and was
displayed three times at random intervals throughout the course of the simulation. Participants
were required to click on the red aircraft using the standard computer mouse and then enter a
predetermined code that was made available to them on a piece of paper located on the first
computer monitor in order to overcome the situation.

Figure 11: Intruder Aircraft (IA) displayed as a red aircraft
The second secondary task consisted of responding to recommendations, made by the
automation, to change the UAV flight path (Figure 12). Participants were required to respond to
these recommendations when ―pop-up threats‖ were encountered by the UAV. These so-called
―pop-up threats‖ were designed into the flight path; yet, they were made undetectable to the
participant until the UAV encountered them at different waypoints. At that time, the automation
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made a recommendation to change the route of the flight path in order to avoid the ―pop-up
threat;‖ however, not all of the recommendations that were made by the automation were
necessary. As a result, the participant was required to acknowledge the recommended change
and either ―accept‖ or ―reject‖ the route change.

Figure 12: Flight path change recommendations for ―pop-up threats‖
The third and final secondary task involved the MMI (Figure 13) that was displayed at
the top of the TSD. The MMI was represented by a series of three round lights (green, yellow,
and red) organized in a horizontal line that is similar to a horizontal stoplight. These series of
lights indicated the status of the UAV; green represented a state of good health, yellow indicated
that action is needed, and red indicated that an urgent action is needed. If the status of the UAV
was green, the participant did not need to take any action; on the contrary, if the status of the
UAV was either yellow or red, the participant needed to take immediate action by clicking on the
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illuminated yellow or red light and correctly type in a string of text that appeared on the screen of
the first computer monitor (Figure 14). Once the participant typed in the correct text string, the
MMI returned to its original state, which was that of the color green, indicating that is had
returned to a state of good health.

Figure 13: Mission Mode Indicator (MMI)
Figure 14: MMI pop-up ―input code‖ screen

The MIIIRO software automatically, and objectively, measured the results of the three
secondary tasks. These measures consisted of the number of events and response times for the
IA, the ―pop-up threats,‖ and the MMI. In order to subjectively measure the participants‘ mental
workload, the NASA-TLX standardized subjective workload scale (Appendix D) was used
following the completion of the primary and secondary task in each of the four scenarios. The
NASA-TLX measure provided an overall mental workload scale based on a weighted average of
the following six subscales: mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance,
effort, and frustration.
Procedure
Once the participants arrived at the lab, they were asked to read, acknowledge, and sign
an informed consent form (Appendix A) after the purpose of the study and the compensation of
the study was explained to each one. Following this, each participant was given a biographical
questionnaire. The participants were then introduced to the paper-pencil version of the NASATLX standardized subjective workload scale and the trust survey; the proper method of filling
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out the form was also explained at that time. In order to allow familiarization of the MIIIRO
simulator, each participant went through a five-minute training session that included an
instructional hands-on training session with the occurrence of all possible scenario events that
were going to occur during the actual study session. However, 50% was used for system
reliability and a 15 second time pressure was used to avoid any learning effects; reliability
percentage at 50% corresponded to the ATR being correct 50 percent of the time while having a
15 second time limit to acquire the target. After the training process, the participant was given
the opportunity to ask questions or comment on any concerns he or she may have had. Once any
questions or concerns had been addressed, the participant began with the actual data collection
phase of the study.
Each participant received four treatment scenarios using the LS-4 Design in order to
avoid any learning effects. Those four treatment scenarios included, in no particular order: (1)
40% system reliability with 5 seconds time pressure, (2) 40% system reliability with 10 seconds
time pressure, (3) 80% system reliability with 5 seconds time pressure, and (4) 80% system
reliability with 10 seconds time pressure. Those treatments were selected on the basis of previous
research studies that focused on other levels of treatment. Each of those treatment scenarios
lasted about seven minutes with a five-minute break after the second treatment scenario. After
the completion of each treatment scenario, participants were asked to fill out the NASA-TLX
standardized subjective workload scale, resulting in four separate forms for the NASA-TLX
workload scale for each participant. Each participant was also asked to complete a trust survey
(Appendix D) of the MIIIRO software after each treatment scenario, which assessed perceived
reliability, technical competence, perceived understandability, faith, and personal attachment;
each participant was then verbally notified of their performance during the debriefing phase of
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the study and any further questions or concerns were addressed at that time. Once all participants
had completed the study, the participant with the best overall performance was contacted to
receive $50.
Statement of Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 1:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, they will report
lower mental workload than when they are exposed to low system
reliability.

Hypothesis 2:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, they will report
higher trust levels than when they are exposed to low system reliability.

Hypothesis 3:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their processing
time score will be lower (better) in the primary task than when they are
exposed to low system reliability.

Hypothesis 4:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their target
acquisition accuracy score will be higher (better) in the primary task than
when they are exposed to low system reliability.

Hypothesis 5:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their processing
time score for the Intruder Aircraft (IA) will be lower (better) in the
secondary task than when they are exposed to low system reliability.
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Hypothesis 6:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their processing
time score for the pop-up threats will be lower (better) in the secondary
task than when they are exposed to low system reliability.

Hypothesis 7:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their processing
time score for the Mission Mode Indicator (MMI) will be lower (better) in
the secondary task than when they are exposed to low system reliability.

Hypothesis 8:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, they
will report lower mental workload than when they are exposed to the
higher time pressure condition.

Hypothesis 9:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, they
will report higher trust levels than when they are exposed to the higher
time pressure condition.

Hypothesis 10:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, their
processing time score will be lower (better) in the primary task than when
they are exposed to the higher time pressure condition.

Hypothesis 11:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, their
target acquisition accuracy score will be higher (better) in the primary task
than when they are exposed to the higher time pressure condition.

Hypothesis 12:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, their
processing time score for the Intruder Aircraft (IA) will be lower (better)
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in the secondary task than when they are exposed to the higher time
pressure condition.
Hypothesis 13:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, their
processing time score for the pop-up threats will be lower (better) in the
secondary task than when they are exposed to the higher time pressure
condition.

Hypothesis 14:

When participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition, their
processing time score for the Mission Mode Indicator (MMI) will be
lower (better) in the secondary task than when they are exposed to the
higher time pressure condition.

Hypothesis 15:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
mental workload.

Hypothesis 16:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
trust levels.

Hypothesis 17:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
primary task processing time.

Hypothesis 18:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
primary task target acquisition accuracy.

Hypothesis 19:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
secondary task Intruder Aircraft (IA).
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Hypothesis 20:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
secondary task pop-up threats.

Hypothesis 21:

An interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
secondary task Mission Mode Indicator (MMI).
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Results
The intention of this study was to analyze the effects of system reliability and time
pressure on UAS operator performance and mental workload. Repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) tests were used to analyze the effect of each independent variable on the
following dependent variables: image processing accuracy, image processing time, MMI
processing time, pop-up threats re-route processing time, IA processing time, and mental
workload scores which were subjectively collected by the NASA-TLX form. Trust of the system
was collected and analyzed through the use of a survey for exploratory purposes. It is included in
the outcome of the results described in this section. A type I error alpha value (α) of 0.05 was
used to determine significance.
Primary Task
There were two primary task performance measures collected during this study which
included image processing time and target acquisition accuracy. Repeated measures ANOVAs
were conducted to analyze the hypotheses made regarding each primary task performance
measure.
Image Processing Time
Image processing time was the first primary task performance dependent measure to be
tested. Hypothesis 3 stated that the processing time score of participants will be lower (better) in
the primary task when they are exposed to high system reliability (80%) than when they are
exposed to low system reliability (40%). Hypothesis 10 stated that when participants are exposed
to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds), their processing time score will be lower
(better) in the primary task than when they are exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5
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seconds). The means and standard deviations for image processing time are presented in Table 6.
The results of the ANOVA for image processing time are shown in Table 7.
Table 6: Primary Task‘s Image Processing Time Means and Standard Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

2384.500

449.459

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

2506.125

757.080

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

2389.667

474.585

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

2844.083

623.191

24

Table 7: ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Image Processing Time
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

Sum of
Squares (SS)
1990944.010

df

Mean Square

1

1990944.010

13.613

.001*

Observed
Power
.942

Time Pressure

706408.594

1

706408.594

3.964

.059

.479

System
Reliability*Time
Pressure

664501.760

1

664501.760

3.223

.086

.405

Error (System
Reliability)

3363760.740

23

146250.467

Error (Time Pressure)

4099122.156

23

178222.702

Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

4742710.990

23

206204.826

F

p

* indicates p value < 0.05
The main effect of system reliability on image processing time was analyzed first and
was found to be statistically significant with F(1, 23) = 13.613, p = .001. The significance of this
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effect indicates that the participants‘ processing time were significantly lower (better) in the
primary task when they were exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than when they were
exposed to the low system reliability (40%). As a result, hypothesis 3 was supported.
The main effect of time pressure on image processing time was also analyzed with
F(1,23) = 3.964 and p = .059 and was shown to be statistically insignificant. The insignificance
of this effect indicates that the participants‘ processing time scores were not impacted
significantly by the time pressure. As a result, hypothesis 10 was not supported.
The results of these two main effects on image processing time are shown in Figure 15.

Image Processing Time (ms)
2900

2844.083

System Reliability

2800
2700
2600
2500
2400

2506.125
2384.5 2389.667

40%
80%

2300
2200
2100
5 Seconds

10 Seconds
Time Pressure

Figure 15: System Reliability and Time Pressure Effects on Image Processing Time

In addition to the main effects of image processing time reported previously, hypothesis
17 stated that an interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for primary
task processing time. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 8.
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Table 8: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on Image Processing Time

System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
2384.500
2389.667
2506.125
2844.083

Standard
Error
91.745
96.874
154.538
127.208

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2194.710
2189.267
2186.438
2580.933

2574.290
2590.067
2825.812
3107.234

The interaction effect between system reliability and time pressure was found to be
statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 3.223 and p = .086. The insignificance of this effect
indicates that there was no significant interaction between system reliability and time pressure on
image processing time; as a result, hypothesis 17 was not supported.
Target Acquisition Accuracy
Target acquisition accuracy was the second primary task performance dependent measure
to be tested. Hypothesis 4 stated that when participants are exposed to high system reliability
(80%), their target acquisition accuracy score will be higher (better) in the primary task than
when they are exposed to low system reliability (40%). Hypothesis 11 stated that when
participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds), their target
acquisition accuracy score will be higher (better) in the primary task than when they are exposed
to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). The means and standard deviations for target
acquisition accuracy are presented in Table 9. The results of the ANOVA are presented in Table
10 and are meant to reflect percentages.
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Table 9: Primary Task‘s Target Acquisition Accuracy Means and Standard Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

84.875

16.201

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

86.000

10.299

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

85.542

12.635

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

77.792

19.580

24

Table 10: ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Target Acquisition Accuracy
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

Sum of
Squares (SS)
263.344

df

Mean Square

1

263.344

3.641

.069

Observed
Power
.448

F

p

Time Pressure

341.260

1

341.260

6.717

.016*

.699

System
Reliability*Time
Pressure

472.594

1

472.594

3.622

.070

.446

Error (System
Reliability)

1663.406

23

72.322

Error (Time Pressure)

1168.490

23

50.804

Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

3001.156

23

130.485

* indicates p value < 0.05
The main effect of system reliability on target acquisition accuracy was examined first
and was found to be statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 3.641 and p = .069. The
insignificance of this effect indicates that the target acquisition accuracy of participants was not
significantly higher (better) when they were exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than

49

when they were exposed to the low system reliability (40%). As a result, hypothesis 4 was not
supported.
The main effect of time pressure on target acquisition accuracy was also analyzed with
F(1,23) = 6.717 and p = .016 and was shown to be statistically significant (p < 0.05). The
significance of this effect indicates that the target acquisition accuracy of participants was higher
(better) when they were exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds) than when
they were exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). As a result, hypothesis 11
was supported.
The results of these two main effects on target acquisition accuracy are shown in Figure
16.

Target Acquisition Accuracy
88
System Reliability

86

84.875

86.000

85.542

84
82
80

77.792

78

40%
80%

76
74
72
5 Seconds

10 Seconds
Time Pressure

Figure 16: System Reliability and Time Pressure Effects on Target Acquisition Accuracy

In addition to the main effects for target acquisition accuracy reported previously,
hypothesis 18 stated that an interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for
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primary task target acquisition accuracy. The means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 11.
Table 11: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on Target Acquisition Accuracy

System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
84.875
85.542
86.000
77.792

Standard
Error
3.307
2.579
2.102
3.997

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
78.034
80.206
81.651
69.524

91.716
90.877
90.349
86.060

The interaction effect between system reliability and time pressure was found to be
statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 3.622 and p = .070. The insignificance of this effect
indicates that there was no significant interaction between system reliability and time pressure on
target acquisition accuracy; as a result, hypothesis 18 was not supported.
Secondary Task
In addition to the primary tasks, there were three secondary task performance measures
collected during this study, which included Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time, pop-up threats
re-routing processing time, and Mission Mode Indicator (MMI) processing time. Repeated
measures ANOVAs were conducted to analyze the hypotheses made regarding each secondary
task performance measure.
Intruder Aircraft (IA) Processing Time
IA processing time was the first of the three secondary task performance dependent
measures to be tested. Hypothesis 5 stated that the processing time score for the IA will be lower
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(better) when participants are exposed to high system reliability (80%) than when they are
exposed to low system reliability (40%). Hypothesis 12 stated that when participants are exposed
to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds), their processing time score for the IA will be
lower (better) in the secondary task than when they are exposed to the higher time pressure
condition (5 seconds). The means and standard deviations for IA processing time are presented
in Table 12. The results of the ANOVA for IA processing time are shown in Table 13.
Table 12: Secondary Task‘s IA Processing Time Means and Standard Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

6112.583

1965.309

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

6405.458

3631.532

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

5890.542

2210.470

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

5902.708

1741.681

24
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Table 13: ANOVA Source Table for Secondary Task IA Processing Time
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

Sum of
Squares (SS)
558302.510

df

Mean Square

F

p

1

558302.510

.393

.537

Observed
Power
.092

Time Pressure

3151937.760

1

3151937.760

1.188

.287

.181

System
Reliability*Time
Pressure

472783.010

1

472783.010

.075

.787

.058

Error (System
Reliability)

3.264E7

23

1419028.293

Error (Time Pressure)

6.101E7

23

2652628.543

Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

1.457E8

23

6333738.619

The main effect of system reliability on IA processing time was examined first and was
found to be statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = .393 and p = .537. The insignificance of this
effect indicates that the IA processing time of participants was not significantly lower (better)
when they were exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the
low system reliability (40%). As a result, hypothesis 5 was not supported.
The main effect of time pressure on IA processing time was also analyzed with F(1,23) =
1.188 and p = .287 and was also shown to be statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). The
insignificance of this effect indicates that the IA processing time of participants was not
significantly lower (better) when they were exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10
seconds) than when they were exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). As a
result, hypothesis 12 was not supported.
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In addition to the main effects for IA processing time reported previously, hypothesis 19
stated that an interaction will exist between system reliability and time pressure for secondary
task IA. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 14.
Table 14: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on IA Processing Time

System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
6112.583
5890.542
6405.458
5902.708

Standard
Error
401.167
451.210
741.283
355.519

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
5282.706
4957.142
4871.997
5167.261

6942.461
6823.941
7938.920
6638.156

The interaction effect between system reliability and time pressure was found to be
statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = .075 and p = .787. The insignificance of this effect
indicates that there was no significant interaction between system reliability and time pressure on
IA processing time; as a result, hypothesis 19 was not supported.
Pop-up Threats Re-routing Processing Time
The second of the three secondary tasks performance dependent measures to be tested
was the processing time for the re-routing of pop-up threats. Hypothesis 6 stated that when
participants are exposed to high system reliability (80%), their processing time sore for the popup threats will be lower (better) in the secondary task than when they are exposed to low system
reliability (40%). Hypothesis 13 stated that when participants are exposed to the lower time
pressure condition (10 seconds), their processing time score for pop-up threats will be lower
(better) in the secondary task than when they are exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5
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seconds). Table 15 presents the means and standard deviations for the pop-up threats re-routing
processing time and Table 16 shows the results of the ANOVA.
Table 15: Secondary Task‘s Pop-up Threats Re-routing Processing Time Means and Standard
Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

2568.333

646.298

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

3078.333

924.850

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

3074.167

721.195

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

2901.417

858.656

24

Table 16: ANOVA Source Table for Secondary Task Pop-up Threats Re-routing Processing
Time
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

Sum of
Squares (SS)
682425.375

Time Pressure
System
Reliability*Time
Pressure
Error (System
Reliability)
Error (Time Pressure)
Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

df

Mean Square

1

682425.375

1.345

.258

Observed
Power
.199

649117.042

1

649117.042

1.833

.189

.254

2796885.375

1

2796885.375

6.142

.021*

.661

1.167E7

23

507302.092

8147110.458

23

354222.194

1.047E7

23

455406.484

F

p

* indicates p value < 0.05
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The main effect of system reliability on pop-up threats processing time was examined
first and was found to be statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 1.345 and p = .258; p > 0.05.
The insignificance of this effect indicates that the participants‘ pop-up threats re-routing
processing times were not significantly lower (better) when they were exposed to the high
system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the low system reliability (40%). As a
result, hypothesis 6 was not supported.
The main effect of time pressure on pop-up threats processing time was also analyzed
with F(1,23) = 1.833 and p = .189 and was shown to be statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). The
insignificance of this effect indicates that the participants‘ pop-up threats re-routing processing
times were not significantly lower (better) when they were exposed to the lower time pressure
condition (10 seconds) than when they were exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5
seconds). As a result, hypothesis 13 was not supported.
In addition to the main effects for pop-up threats re-routing processing time reported
previously, hypothesis 20 stated than an interaction will exist between system reliability and time
pressure for secondary task pop-up threats. The means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 17.
Table 17: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on Pop-up Threats Re-routing Processing Time

System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
2568.333
3074.167
3078.333
2901.417

Standard
Error
131.925
147.213
188.784
175.272

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2295.426
2769.633
2687.804
2538.838

2841.241
3378.700
3468.863
3263.995
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The interaction effect between system reliability and time pressure was found to be
statistically significant with F(1, 23) = 6.142 and p = .021; p < 0.05. The significance of this
effect indicates that there was an interaction between system reliability and time pressure for
pop-up threats re-routing processing time; as a result, hypothesis 20 was supported. The results
of this interaction are shown in Figure 17.

Pop-up Threats Re-routing Processing
Time (ms)
System Reliability

3200
3000
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2800
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Figure 17: System Reliability and Time Pressure Interaction on Pop-up Threats Re-routing
Processing Time

Mission Mode Indicator (MMI) Processing Time
The final secondary task performance measure, or DV, that was tested was the MMI
processing time. Hypothesis 7 stated that when participants are exposed to high system reliability
(80%), their processing time score for the MMI will be lower (better) in the secondary task than
when they are exposed to low system reliability (40%). Hypothesis 14 stated that when
participants are exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds), their processing time
score for MMI will be lower (better) in the secondary task than when they are exposed to higher
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time pressure condition (5 seconds). Table 18 shows the means and standard deviations for the
MMI processing time. The results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 19.
Table 18: Secondary Task‘s MMI Processing Time Means and Standard Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

9934.667

3129.013

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

9860.667

3820.227

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

8994.500

3148.219

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

9229.500

4649.934

24

Table 19: ANOVA Source Table for Secondary Task MMI Processing Time
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

df

Mean Square

F

p

1

155526.000

.024

.879

Observed
Power
.052

1.481E7

1

1.481E7

2.960

.099

.378

572886.000

1

572886.000

.088

.769

.059

Error (System
Reliability)

1.518E8

23

6600177.152

Error (Time Pressure)

1.151E8

23

5005449.123

Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

1.499E8

23

6515358.891

Time Pressure
System
Reliability*Time
Pressure

Sum of
Squares (SS)
155526.000

The main effect of system reliability on MMI processing time was analyzed first and was
found to be statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = .024 and p = .879. The insignificance of this
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effect indicates that the participants‘ MMI processing times were not significantly lower (better)
when they were exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the
low system reliability (40%). As a result, hypothesis 7 was not supported.
The main effect of time pressure on MMI processing time was also analyzed with F(1,23)
= 2.960 and p = .099 and was shown to be statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). The
insignificance of this effect indicates that the participants‘ MMI processing times were not
significantly lower (better) when they were exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10
seconds) than when they were exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). As a
result, hypothesis 14 was not supported.
In addition to the main effects for pop-up threats re-routing processing time reported
previously, hypothesis 21 stated that an interaction will exist between system reliability and time
pressure for secondary task MMI. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 20.
Table 20: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on MMI Processing Time

System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
9934.667
8994.500
9860.667
9229.500

Standard
Error
638.707
642.628
779.801
949.164

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
8613.400
7665.124
8247.526
7266.005

11255.933
10323.876
11473.807
11192.995

The interaction effect between system reliability and time pressure was found to be
statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = .088 and p = .769. The insignificance of this effect
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indicates that there was no significant interaction between system reliability and time pressure
for MMI processing time; as a result, hypothesis 21 was not supported.
Mental Workload
Mental workload was subjectively measured using the NASA-TLX after each trial. The
subjective ratings were on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 on six different workload factors, with
100 being the highest level of workload and 0 being the lowest level and adjusted based on the
pair-wise comparison among workload factors. Hypotheses 1, 8, and 15 referred to mental
workload. Hypothesis 1 stated that when participants are exposed to high system reliability
(80%), they will report lower mental workload than when they are exposed to low system
reliability (40%). Hypothesis 8 stated that when participants are exposed to the lower time
pressure (10 seconds), they will report lower mental workload than when they are exposed to the
higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test
the hypotheses regarding mental workload. Table 21 shows the means and standard deviations
for mental workload and the results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 22.
Table 21: Mental Workload Means and Standard Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

39.139

19.910

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

32.083

18.880

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

36.903

23.476

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

35.862

20.305

24
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Table 22: ANOVA Source Table for Mental Workload
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

Sum of
Squares (SS)
14.281

F

p

14.281

.074

.789

Observed
Power
.058

df

Mean Square

1

Time Pressure

393.470

1

393.470

4.292

.050

.510

System
Reliability*Time
Pressure

217.060

1

217.060

2.346

.139

.312

Error (System
Reliability)

4467.827

23

194.253

Error (Time Pressure)

2108.460

23

91.672

Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

2128.183

23

92.530

System reliability on mental workload was analyzed first and was found to be statistically
insignificant with F(1, 23) = .074 and p = .789. The insignificance of this effect indicates that the
participants‘ mental workload scores were not significantly lower (better) when they were
exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the low system
reliability (40%). As a result, hypothesis 1 was not supported.
The main effect of time pressure on mental workload was also analyzed with F(1,23) =
4.292 and p = .050 and was shown to be statistically significant (p = 0.05). The significance of
this effect indicates that the participants‘ mental workload scores were significantly lower
(better) when they were exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds) than when
they were exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). As a result, hypothesis 8
was supported.
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The interaction between system reliability and time pressure for mental workload was
also analyzed. Hypothesis 15 stated that an interaction will occur between the main effects. The
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 23.
Table 23: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on Mental Workload

System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
39.139
32.083
36.903
35.862

Standard
Error
4.064
3.854
4.792
4.145

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
30.732
24.111
26.990
27.288

47.547
40.055
46.816
44.436

In addition to the main effects, the interaction effect between system reliability and time
pressure was found to be statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 2.346 and p = .139; p > 0.05.
The insignificance of this effect indicates that there was no significant interaction between
system reliability and time pressure for mental workload; as a result, hypothesis 15 was not
supported.
Trust
Trust was subjectively measured using a trust survey that was given after each treatment
scenario. The trust survey assessed perceived reliability, technical competence, perceived
understandability, faith, and personal attachment. It had a rating from 1 to 10 with 1 representing
never happening or occurring and 10 representing always happening or occurring. Hypothesis 2
stated that the trust levels of participants will be higher (better) in the primary task when they are
exposed to high system reliability (80%) than when they are exposed to low system reliability
(40%). Hypothesis 9 stated that when participants are exposed to the lower time pressure
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condition (10 seconds), their trust levels will be higher (better) in the primary task than when
they are exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). Table 24 shows the means
and standard deviations for trust for the four levels of treatment scenarios. Table 25 presents the
results of the ANOVA and are meant to reflect percentages.
Table 24: Trust Means and Standard Deviations
Mean

Standard Deviation

N

40% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

64.704

14.427

24

40% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

66.529

12.305

24

80% System Reliability / High Time Pressure

68.529

12.339

24

80% System Reliability / Low Time Pressure

65.875

14.166

24

Table 25: ANOVA Source Table for Trust
Source
Greenhouse-Geisser
System Reliability

df

Mean Square

1

60.325

1.784

.195

Observed
Power
.249

4.125

1

4.125

.105

.749

.061

120.378

1

120.378

1.744

.200

.244

Error (System
Reliability)

777.927

23

33.823

Error (Time Pressure)

905.387

23

39.365

Error (System
Reliability*Time
Pressure)

1587.645

23

69.028

Time Pressure
System
Reliability*Time
Pressure

Sum of
Squares (SS)
60.325

F

p
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The main effect of system reliability on trust was analyzed first and was found to be
statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 1.784 and p = .195. The insignificance of this effect
indicates that the participants‘ trust levels were not significantly higher (better) when they were
exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the low system
reliability (40%). In this case, hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Time pressure on trust was also analyzed with F(1,23) = .105 and p = .749 and was
shown to be statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). The insignificance of this effect indicates that
the participants‘ trust levels were not significantly higher (better) when they were exposed to the
lower time pressure condition (10 seconds) than when they were exposed to the higher time
pressure condition (5 seconds). Hypothesis 9 was not supported in this case.
The interaction effect between system reliability and time pressure was also studied and
was found to be statistically insignificant with F(1, 23) = 1.744 and p = .200. The insignificance
of this effect indicates that there was no significant interaction between system reliability and
time pressure for trust. As a result, hypothesis 16 was not supported. The means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 26.
Table 26: Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of System Reliability and Time
Pressure on Trust
95% Confidence Interval
System
Reliability
Low
High

Time
Pressure
High
Low
High
Low

Mean
64.704
66.529
68.529
65.875

Standard
Error
2.945
2.512
2.519
2.892

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

58.612
61.333
63.319
59.893

70.796
71.725
73.739
71.857
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The results previously described have been an account of the outcomes of the
experimental findings. In the coming section, discussion, the perceived reasons of these results
will be discussed.

Discussion
The objective of this study was to examine the effect of system reliability and time
pressure on UAS operator task performance and mental workload when conducting certain tasks
relating to UAV operation. The intention of this study was to broaden and advance current
knowledge about the mental workload associated with operating a highly autonomous UAS,
particularly with technology whose system is not 100% reliable during tasks and during
extremely time sensitive operations. This study‘s aim was to provide knowledge, which can be
applied to the design of future UAS systems, in order to improve operator performance through
appropriate levels of mental workload. The knowledge provided is in regards to different levels
of system reliability and time pressure and their effects on an operator trying to maintain a high
level of performance in the midst of uncertainty and pressure. The results of this study are
discussed here, organized into four main areas of interest: primary task performance measures,
secondary task performance measures, mental workload, and trust for exploratory reasons.
Primary Task Performance Measures
There were two primary task performance measures collected during this study: image
processing time and target acquisition accuracy.
Image Processing Time
From the results, image processing time showed significance for system reliability and no
significant effect for time pressure. There was also found to be a no significant interaction of
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system reliability and time pressure with regards to image processing time. The significance for
system reliability indicated that the participants‘ processing time scores were lower (better) when
they were exposed to the high system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the low
system reliability (40%). This coincided with predictions made about system reliability and
image processing time. With high system reliability, participants did not need to make many
clicks to fix the target recognizer, thus it was expected to save time, which was the one reason
why such significance was believed to have occurred. An explanation for this is that when
system reliability was high, it meant that most of the targets were pre-selected by the ATR from
the MIIIRO software; as a result, participants only needed to click ―accept‖ rather than select
targets, or deselect distracters, and then click on ―accept;‖ it saved time, thus having a lower
processing time.
There was no significance found for time pressure on image processing time. This
insignificant effect of time pressure on image processing time suggests that participants‘
processing time scores were not significantly lower (better) when they were exposed to the lower
time pressure condition (10 seconds) than when they were exposed to the higher time pressure
condition (5 seconds). This directly contradicted the predictions made about time pressure
regarding image processing time. The fact that the participants were under more time pressure (5
seconds) to process the images possibly led them to exceed the 5 second time limit thus having
the MIIIRO system automatically answering for them. This would also explain why there was a
significant effect for system reliability and not for time pressure. High time pressure, such as 5
seconds, does not give participants enough time to properly think through a task in order to make
a clear and concise decision; either a wrong decision will be taken or no decision at all, which in
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the latter case would result in having the MIIIRO system to time out and move on to the next
target.
The interaction of system reliability and time pressure showed insignificant results for
image processing time. The insignificance of this effect indicates that there was no significant
interaction between system reliability and time pressure on image processing time. In other
words, the effects of system reliability and time pressure did not impact the time it took for
participants to process the images presented to them. This interaction was hypothesized to be
significant, but a possible explanation for this occurrence could be related to the insignificance of
time pressure on image processing time. If participants were not pressured for time, they may
have been able to more carefully examine the images presented to them than under a time
constraint; however, when under a more rigorous time pressure constraint, participants may have
resorted to guessing or completely missing the opportunity to guess by having the MIIIRO
software answer for them, resulting in insignificant processing times. One explanation for this
could be from the side effects that occur as a result of time pressure, such as stress and poor
decision making. Wickens, et al. (2004) described that an increase in stress levels, caused by
time constraints, causes an operator to have lower performance ratings than if he or she had more
time allotted and lower stress levels. High time constraints and stress also play a role in decision
making, altering a person‘s ability to clearly think through a problem and make a precise and
accurate decision. These reasons could explain why time pressure had so significant effect on
image processing time.
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Target Acquisition Accuracy
The second primary performance measure collected in this study was target acquisition
accuracy. Results showed that there was no significant effect for system reliability on target
acquisition accuracy. The insignificance of this effect indicates that the target acquisition
accuracy of participants was not significantly higher (better) when they were exposed to the high
system reliability (80%) than when they were exposed to the low system reliability (40%). In
other words, the participants‘ accuracy did not matter on whether or not the reliability of the
system was high or low. This could be due to a number of reasons, including the reality that
participants did not know the reliability of the software prior to their experience. As a result, they
may have treated each trial in the same manner and took their time to make each decision. This
may have occurred in place of putting complete trust in the software‘s ability to choose the
correct targets with the ATR tool, which had the ability to recognize targets or objects based on
pre-set data obtained from the MIIIRO software.
There was a significant effect for time pressure on target acquisition accuracy. The
significance of this effect indicates that the target acquisition accuracy of participants was higher
(better) when they were exposed to the lower time pressure condition (10 seconds) than when
they were exposed to the higher time pressure condition (5 seconds). A reason for this could be
due to the fact that having more time, or having lower time pressure, allowed the participants‘ to
more carefully examine the images presented to them and thus making better decisions as to
which image was a target and which image was a distracter. A trade-off effect may have affected
the results of target acquisition accuracy in which the quality of system reliability was lost in
return for gaining better quality from the time pressure. This could be seen from the results that
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showed a significant effect for time pressure in contrast to system reliability, which did not have
a significant effect on the accuracy of target acquisition.
There was no significant interaction found between system reliability and time pressure
for target acquisition accuracy. This could be due to the insignificant effect that system reliability
had on accurately acquiring targets. It could also be due to the manner in which participants
treated each trial; the same manner. As a result, accuracy scores were compromised.
Secondary Task Performance Measures
Secondary task performance measures were often used as another measure of mental
workload, attempting to determine how much excess capacity was available while performing
the primary task. There were three secondary task performance measures involved in the current
study: IA processing time, pop-up threats re-routing processing time, and MMI processing time.
Intruder Aircraft (IA) Processing Time
The secondary task of IA processing required the participants to respond to a red aircraft
icon by clicking on the icon and typing in a given code, which appeared on the TSD. IA
processing time yielded no significant differences for the effects of system reliability, time
pressure, and their interaction. As a result, hypotheses 5, 12, and 19 were not supported. A
possible explanation for this lack of significance is the number of IA events that took place
during each treatment scenario; only two IA events occurred per treatment. With such few
opportunities for the different tasks to conflict, the system reliability and time pressure effects
placed on the primary task had little chance to affect performance on IA processing time. From
the results, a conclusion can be made that the participants either had enough time to respond;
consequently, if participants missed the response time, the IA would disappear and count against
them. However, there were not enough IA events to make a significant difference.
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Pop-up Threats Re-routing Processing Time
The secondary task measure for pop-up threats re-routing processing time required the
participants to either accept or reject a recommended flight path change made by the automation
in order to avoid a threat which had appeared during the simulation. Pop-up threats re-routing
processing time yielded no significant differences for the effects of system reliability and time
pressure. As a result, hypotheses 6 and 13 were not supported. A possible explanation for this
lack of significance was the number of pop-up threats that took place during each treatment
scenario; only two events occurred per treatment. In addition, the automation automatically
―accepted‖ the flight path change if the participant missed his or her time frame to ―accept‖ or
―reject;‖ the time out period would impact the significant results. The interaction between system
reliability and time pressure, however, was shown to be significant, thus hypothesis 20 was
supported.
Mission Mode Indicator (MMI) Processing Time
The secondary task of MMI processing required the participants to respond to either a
yellow light or a red light within the indicator. The participant would respond by clicking on
whichever light came one and typed in a number string given to them by the MIIIRO software.
The processing time for MMI showed no significant results for the main effects of system
reliability and time pressure, as well as no significant results for their interaction. This lack of
significance does not support hypotheses 7, 14, or 21. An explanation for this lack of
significance could be due to the participants being more concerned with image processing than
with secondary tasks; it is evident that when participants take longer to process the images, as in
the case of the low system reliability images, secondary task performance is affected. As MMI is
another secondary task, its priority is of less importance in comparison to primary tasks; in
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addition, changes in this task are not easily detected, unless they are looked at specifically. This
may be an explanation which fits the data for the interaction.
Mental Workload
Mental workload was subjectively measured using the NASA-TLX after each treatment
scenario, resulting in four NASA-TLX forms for each participant. The subjective ratings were
on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level of workload and 0 being the
lowest level. The results for mental workload showed no significant results for the main effects
of system reliability and time pressure, as well as no significant results for their interaction. This
lack of significance does not support hypotheses 1, 8, and 15. As a result, the results do not
support the argument made regarding an increase in mental workload as system reliability
decreases and time pressure increases. One explanation for these results is the tasks involved in
the study. Each individual participant had his or her own perceived thoughts on the mental
workload they experienced during each task in a trial. This, in turn, leads to another explanation,
which is the sensitive nature and validity of the NASA-TLX itself. The NASA-TLX is based
around personal feelings and opinions, hence why it is subjective and not objective. This fact
alone plays a major role in the outcomes of the results as each person perceives situations and
tasks differently from the next person; as a result, mental workload is difficult to accurately
measure. In addition, the results of mental workload are in correspondence with the results of the
secondary task performance measures in terms of their insignificance. An explanation for this
could be that due to the insignificance of the secondary tasks, mental workload was not at an
increased level to the participants and thus resulted in insignificant results.
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Trust
Trust was assessed for exploratory reasons and was not a main focus of the study.
Participants were given a trust survey to fill out after each treatment scenario, resulting in four
surveys per participant. The trust survey assessed perceived reliability, technical competence,
perceived understandability, faith, and personal attachment. It had a rating from 1 (never) to 10
(always). The results for trust showed no significant results for the main effects of system
reliability and time pressure, as well as no significant results for their interaction. The
insignificance of these effects indicate that the participants‘ trust levels were not significantly
higher (better) when they were exposed to the higher system reliability condition (80%) and
lower time pressure condition (10 seconds). As an implication to the results, hypotheses 2, 9, and
16 were not supported. This could be due to the participants‘ not having enough knowledge
about the MIIIRO software. It could also be due to not having enough trust in the reliability of
the system, in addition to not having enough trials over an extended time period to build trust
levels with the software.
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Practical Implications
The next generation of UAS operation, both abroad and within the NAS, holds many
opportunities for the future of flight. Many tasks can be performed more safely and efficiently by
unoccupied aircraft; however, in order to implement the use of UAS for these tasks, more
research and development needs to take place in order to assess the capabilities and limitations of
the aircraft system. Researching factors that influence operator performance and mental
workload need to be sought out in order to gain more knowledge and broaden understanding.
This should be done so as to avoid possible hazards that could lead to UAV accidents related to
poor performance levels due to too high or too low levels of mental workload.
System reliability plays a crucial role in determining how to train operators and how to
evaluate which operators are better suited for performance, in cases where the reliability of the
system is in jeopardy; however, time pressure also plays an integral role in determining how well
a task can be performed and in determining its effect on an operator‘s mental workload. Time
pressure is particularly important when dealing with time sensitive environments, such as UAS
operation. Research focusing on trying to understand the factors that increase time pressure will
be important to study as these types of research could help in future designs of systems that help
alleviate some of those factors. Understanding how and when the automation should assist the
UAS operator will be crucial to know in order to avoid the effects of time pressure, in addition to
avoiding the effects of increased mental workload.
This study demonstrated a significant effect of system reliability on processing times for
images. A significant effect of time pressure on target acquisition accuracy was also found in the
primary task performance measures. The time pressure differences for image processing time,
however, were small enough that they may not require any design changes. Although time
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pressure was found to be statistically insignificant for many of the secondary tasks, the time
differences may be not negligible when dealing with real-life situations. The topic of system
reliability and time pressure should be researched further and reviewed before implementing
design strategies.
Recommendations for Future Research
The next generation of flight is already underway and UAS is in the midst of aviation‘s
next generation. These highly autonomous vehicles involved in UAS can open many doors and
broaden many horizons on how operators perform crucial and time sensitive tasks. Research and
development on issues relating to UAS operator performance can open doors for understanding
what is needed, or not needed, for one operator to supervise multiple vehicles at the same time.
What kind of system is needed? What level of mental workload is expected if an operator is
assigned to multiple vehicles at once? These questions can lead to new questions and more
research efforts. The workload involved with multiple UAS supervision is not known. However,
through further research efforts, more knowledge and understanding can be developed in
applying what is already known for supervision of one UAS to that of multiple UAS. The
inclusion of time pressure, in future research, as a factor when assessing performance would also
help in understanding workload levels of multiple UAS supervision.
Future research on UAS operation can go in many directions, as many factors go into
operating such highly autonomous systems. Another research effort that could be taken into
consideration is gender in choosing operators. Research efforts on gender differences and how
well each multi-task could help in gaining knowledge on what the needs are of designing
systems from a psychological perspective.
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Other research efforts could include the manipulation of participants‘ knowledge
regarding the reliability of the system and the time constraint that is involved, in addition to
providing feedback. The manipulation could go in many ways, including having two groups, one
with prior knowledge of the effects and another group with no knowledge. Feedback could be
given to the participants following each trial, as well, in order to give them the chance to
improve in the remaining trials of the study.
In addition to the above mentioned factors, system reliability and the uncertainty
surrounding the system are crucial factors to take into consideration when performing research
and development studies for UAS design purposes. Due to the operator being separated from the
UAV and the environment surrounding it, it is necessary to have reliable systems and designs.
This is necessary in order to have an operator who is comfortable enough to rely on the system
but, yet at the same time, knowledgeable enough to know when something is going wrong with
the system and realizing that taking manual charge is necessary. Due to the higher level of
uncertainty related to UAS operation in comparison to manned flight, uncertainty in system
reliability is still a notion that can provide insight into operator performance and mental
workload in the course of UAS flight. By further understanding system reliability and
uncertainty when conducting UAS operations, UAS designs can be implemented to reduce the
uncertainty that contributes to higher levels of mental workload and lower levels of performance.
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Conclusion
UAS play a crucial role within military and security operations. Their use has grown
considerably in the last decade and continues to grow, making UAS an important part of
NextGen‘s and the NAS‘s future. UAS have a wide range of capabilities that allow them to
provide a much safer and efficient method for performing a number of tasks while not putting an
operator‘s life in jeopardy. Although a lot of research and development has taken place within
the history of UAS operations, a number of concerns still exist with regard to UAS flight safety
within the NAS and abroad. These concerns need to be addressed before the full potential of this
technology is realized in order to take full advantage of all its capabilities. Designing this
technology with the human in mind is necessary as understanding the human component of these
systems would help resolve many of the human factors concerns, such as operator performance
and mental workload. Once the human component is understood, issues of concern can be solved
through design by providing the ability, for all the system‘s components, to perform at optimum
levels. Studies such as this one will remain to be of importance to continue in order to improve
UAS design so that the available technology could be used to its fullest potential to increase
safety and efficiency.
The factors researched in this study, system reliability and time pressure on UAS operator
performance and mental workload, has contributed to the knowledge and understanding of UAS
operations. However, continuous research, applied to the findings of this study, is indispensable
to future research and development involving UAS tasks and system designs that affect operator
performance and mental workload, as well as other human factors concerns in order to create
more safe and efficient UAS environments.
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Appendix A
IRB Number: 11-130

Informed Consent Form
Unoccupied Aircraft Systems (UAS) System Reliability and Time Pressure Study
Conducted by Rania Wageh Ghatas
Advisor: Dr. Dahai Liu
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
600 South Clyde Morris Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114

This is to certify that you hereby agree to participate in this research project, which is conducted
by Rania Ghatas, a Human Factors and Systems Psychology graduate student at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, sponsored by Dr. Dahai Liu, (386) 226-6214. You acknowledge that
you will receive a demographic survey and will participate in one session that will last
approximately one and a half hours. During this session, you will be asked to complete four
computer-based UAS simulation assessments and fill out two questionnaires after each
assessment; one regarding your perceived feelings of mental workload and the other of trust.
You acknowledge that you have had the opportunity to ask questions about this study and feel
comfortable with what will be expected of you. All information gathered from your participation
will be completely confidential. Your name from the consent form will not be linked to the data
collected from the experiment. You will be compensated for your participation by receiving
either extra credit or $10 and will have the chance to win $50 for best overall performance. You
may withdraw from the study at any time. Your assistance will help us better understand the
effects of system reliability and time pressure on UAS operator performance and mental
workload. If you wish to receive a copy of form or a final report of the study, you may do so
when the results of the study are finalized.
There are no foreseen risks to participants. If at any time during this study you decide that you
need to talk to a counselor, the ERAU counseling center can be reached at (386) 226-6035.
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the experiment or
feel free to call Rania Ghatas at (321) 276-9596 or Dr. Dahai Liu at (386) 226-6214.
Statement of Consent
I acknowledge that my participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary and I am free to
withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific purposes of the
experiment. If I choose to withdraw from the experiment before its termination, I will not
receive any compensation.
Participant‘s Name (Please Print): __________________________________________________
Signature of Participant: __________________________________ Date: __________________
Experimenter: __________________________________________ Date: __________________
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Appendix B
Biographical Questionnaire

ID#: ____________________

Date: ____________________

Please fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate response.
1. What is your age?

________ years

2. What is your gender?

Male / Female

3. Do you have normal or corrected to 20/20 vision?

Yes / No

4. Are you color blind? Yes / No

5. Are you:

Right-handed / Left-handed

6. How many hours per week do you use computers:

_____ hours

7. On a scale of 1 to 5, what is your confidence level in using computers:
Low confidence

-

1

2

3

4

5

-

High confidence

8. On average, how many hours per week do you spend playing computer/video games?
0-5___

6-10___

11-15___

16-20___

21-25+___

9. What type of genre of gaming are you most accustomed to playing?
Action___

Adventure___

Role-Playing___

Strategy___

Simulation___

10. Have you had any other experience participating in unoccupied aircraft simulations?
Yes / No
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11. Do you have any experience flying an unoccupied aircraft or remote controlled aircraft?
Yes / No
If so, please explain: ____________________________________________________________

Adapted from: Peterson, T. (2010). Effect of Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty on Human
Operator Performance and Workload for Autonomous Aerial Vehicle Missions, thesis
final report. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Retrieved February 28th, 2011.
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Appendix C
ID#: ____________

NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Form

Date: ____________

We are interested in your subjective experience of workload for each test trial you completed. Workload is a
difficult concept to define precisely, but a simple one to understand generally. The factors that influence your
experience of workload may come from the task itself, your feelings about your own performance, how much effort
you put in, or the stress and frustration you felt.
One way to find out about workload is to ask people to describe the feelings they experienced. Because workload
may be caused by many different factors, we would like you to evaluate several of them individually rather than
lumping them into a single global evaluation of overall workload. This set of six rating scales was developed for
you to use in evaluating your experiences during the test trial.
Please indicate the level of workload you experienced on each of the 6 scales by circling the line at the point which
best reflects the level of workload you experienced. The ends of the scales are labeled to indicate very low and very
high workload. Points in between those end points represent intermediate values of workload. Please note that the
Performance scale goes from Good on the left to Bad on the right. This order has been confusing for some people.
EFFORT — How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance?
|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

Low

|
High

PERFORMANCE — How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by the
experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your performance in accomplishing these goals?
|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

Good

|
Poor

FRUSTRATION LEVEL — How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed versus secure, gratified,
content, relaxed, and complacent did you feel during the task?
|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

Low

|
High

TEMPORAL DEMAND — How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or
events occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely, or rapid and frantic?
|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

Low

|
High

MENTAL DEMAND — How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding,
calculating, remembering, looking, searching)? Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex, forgiving or
exacting?
|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

Low

|
High

PHYSICAL DEMAND — How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, controlling,
activating)? Was the task physically easy or demanding, slow or brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?
|
Low

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|

|
High
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NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Weighting Form
The forms you filled out included six rating scale factors that can influence workload. We are interested in your
assessment of the relative contribution of these factors to your experience of workload for each test trial you
completed.
People vary in their opinion of what contributes to workload. For example, some people feel that mental or
temporal demands are the essential aspects of workload regardless of the effort they expended or the performance
they achieved. Others feel that if they performed well, the workload must have been low and if they performed
poorly, the workload must have been high. Yet others feel that effort or feelings of frustration are the most
important factors in workload, and so on.
In addition, the factors that create levels of workload differ depending on the task. For example, some tasks might
be difficult because they must be completed very quickly. Others may seem easy or hard because of the intensity of
mental or physical effort required. Yet others feel difficult because they cannot be performed well, no matter how
much effort is expended.
The evaluation you are about to perform is a technique developed by NASA to assess the relative importance of the
six factors that were included in the workload rating scale in determining how much workload you experienced
across all the test trials you just completed.
Below is a list of pairs of rating scale titles (for example Effort vs. Mental demand). For each pair, please circle the
item that was more important to your experience of workload across all the test trials you just completed.

MENTAL DEMAND

VS

PHYSICAL DEMAND

TEMPORAL DEMAND

VS

MENTAL DEMAND

PHYSICAL DEMAND

VS

TEMPORAL DEMAND

EFFORT

VS

PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE

VS

FRUSTRATION

TEMPORAL DEMAND

VS

PERFORMANCE

MENTAL DEMAND

VS

PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE

VS

PHYSICAL DEMAND

EFFORT

VS

FRUSTRATION

TEMPORAL DEMAND

VS

EFFORT

EFFORT

VS

MENTAL DEMAND

PHYSICAL DEMAND

VS

EFFORT

FRUSTRATION

VS

TEMPORAL DEMAND

MENTAL DEMAND

VS

FRUSTRATION

FRUSTRATION

VS

PHYSICAL DEMAND
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Appendix D
Trust Survey
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information about your working experience, your
perception, and your trust of the Multi-modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote
Operations (MIIIRO) software and its automation.
Please base your assessment on your experience with the automation used in the simulation.
ID #: _______________

Treatment #: _______________

Date: __________________

Perceived Reliability

1. I could rely on the automation to function properly
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

2. The automation performed reliably under a variety of conditions
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

3. The automation provided an alert when I was required to make my decision
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

4. The automation generates false-alerts
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

5. The automation misses genuine conflicts/risks

1
Never

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Always
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Technical Competence
6. The automation has appropriate operational understanding of what a conflict is
(parameters used/classifications, etc.)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

7. The alert the automation produces is as good as that which a competent person could
produce
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

8. The automation correctly makes use of all the knowledge and information available to it
to produce an alert
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

Perceived Understandability
9. I understand well how the automation behaves
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

10. I understand how the automation can assist me with decisions I have to make
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

11. It is easy to interpret the automation output
1
Never

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Always
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Faith
12. I believe the automation alerts even in uncertain situations
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

13. When I am uncertain about a situation I believe the automation rather than myself
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

Personal Attachment
19. I would feel a sense of loss if the automation were unavailable
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

19. I find the automation suitable to my method of working
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

16. I like using the automation for decision-making
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Never

10
Always

17. I have a personal preference of making decisions with automation rather than without
automation
1
Never

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Always
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18. At what level of reliability did you think the automation was working? (Please circle your
answer)
40%

50%

70%

80%

90%

99%

19. Do you feel that the level of trust in the system in order to make decisions was affected by
the reliability? (Please circle your answer)
Yes

No

Adapted from: Jaramillo, M. (2011). The Effects of System Reliability and Uncertainty under
High Time Pressure on Operator Performance for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, thesis
final report. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Retrieved February 28th, 2011.
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